Zehra Güner (1)
In March 1885,
Friedrich Engels wrote an article for the London Commonweal under the heading
“England in 1845 and in 1885” as a sequel to his seminal work The Condition of
the Working Class in England. In this article, Engels pictured the condition of
the class movement in 40 years after writing The Condition of the Working Class
in England very vividly as follows:
“Chartism was dying
out. The revival of commercial prosperity, natural after the revulsion of 1847
had spent itself, was put down altogether to the credit of Free Trade. Both
these circumstances had turned the English working-class, politically, into the
tail of the 'great Liberal Party,' the party led by the manufacturers. This
advantage, once gained, had to be perpetuated. And the manufacturing
capitalists, from the Chartist opposition, not to Free Trade, but to the
transformation of Free Trade into the one vital national question, had learnt,
and were learning more and more, that the middle-class can never obtain full
social and political power over the nation except by the help of the
working-class. Thus a gradual change came over the relations between both
classes. The Factory Acts, once the bugbear of all manufacturers, were not only
willingly submitted to, but their expansion into acts regulating almost all
trades was tolerated. Trades’ Unions, hitherto considered inventions of the
devil himself, were now petted and patronised as perfectly legitimate
institutions, and as useful means of spreading sound economical doctrines
amongst the workers. Even strikes, than which nothing had been more nefarious
up to 1848, were now gradually found out to be occasionally very useful,
especially when provoked by the masters themselves, at their own time. Of the
legal enactments, placing the workman at a lower level or at a disadvantage
with regard to the master, at least the most revolting were repealed.”2
Interestingly enough,
the essence of this vivid statement on the working class movement 40 years
after Engels' seminal work, describes the condition of the working class in
Turkey well enough. I mean, in essence but not in form, which I shall elaborate
in a few sentences.
As the working class
failed to advance the movement towards taking the political power in 1847 -it
is a different matter whether or not it was historically possible for the
working class to seize the political power- it was broadly enslaved by the
bourgeois political system and the dominant ideology of “Free Trade”. Engels
was, then, talking about the dying out of Chartism and the working class
movement turning into the tail of the Liberal Party. In his description of the
situation in 1885, Engels refers to the assimilation of the trade union
movement within the bourgeois ideology and the formation of a labor
aristocracy. In his preface to the English edition of his book, he elaborates
on how the capitalists resort to trade unions on different occasions as just
another tool to postpone the impacts of the capitalist crises of
overproduction. These are, of course, facts we know well enough from the
experiences of more than a century now. Yet, Engels' brief description of the
condition of working class in England in 1885 draws a picture of the dynamics
of class struggle in a nutshell.
In essence, as the
working class fails to march towards greater unity and militancy in
class-oriented direction, it is assimilated and defeated by the opposing class,
and thereby, broad sections of the working class become appendages of the
bourgeois political system and ideology. The opposite of unification and greater
militancy becomes the motto of the day, that is fragmentation, disorganization,
assimilation and subjugation.
These are the
essential points of reference which we may draw parallels with Engels'
description and the condition of the working class in Turkey for the last three
decades. Of course, Engels' vivid picture may as well be applied to the working
classes of other countries in these general lines. Therefore, we need to
discuss the peculiarities of the condition of the working class in Turkey in
order to make our argument more comprehensive and plausible.
Engels wrote a book
of almost 250 pages, covering different sections of the working class in
England in order to describe their condition. Of course, in such a brief
article, we do not have enough space neither to discuss the condition of each
section of the working class in Turkey, nor to indicate each and every factor
that have an explanatory power in describing this condition. Furthermore, I do
not have the brilliance of Engels, but I merely resort to the theoretical
heritage of the great masters. Yet, I believe, we can point to several
important, maybe the most important as we see it, factors that have a broad
influence over the working class in Turkey. In general, I simply try to give a
sketch of the factors that lead to the fragmentation, disorganization,
assimilation and subjugation of the working class in Turkey. However, the most
important question, i.e. the strategy and the tactics of the communists to
tackle these forces is left unanswered in this article, for it can only be the
topic of another one.
Unemployment as a
dehumanizing factor
Before drawing
conclusions on the effects of high and persistent levels of unemployment on the
working class in Turkey, allow me to address several data on the issue. But,
first of all, I should explain briefly why I start an article on the condition
of the working class in Turkey with “unemployment”. The reason is simple and
clear: it is not only that the threat of unemployment affects very large segments
of the working class, but the unemployed constitutes one of the largest
sections of the working class in Turkey.
According to the
labor statistics presented by Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI), the
unemployment rate in Turkey as of November 2011 is 9.1 per cent and the number
of the unemployed is 2.5 million persons. However, in terms of the broader and
truer definition of unemployment,3 the number of unemployed reaches to 4.5
million and the unemployment rate to 16.2 per cent approximately. The official
unemployment rate among the youth (those who are between 15 and 24 years of
age) is around 17 per cent, whereas the real rate of unemployment among the
youth is approximately 30 per cent and the number of unemployed young people is
1.438 million. In urban areas and among the youth with higher education levels
these rates are even higher.
The number of those
who are not actively seeking a job but available to start a job has been
gradually increasing, reaching to 1.2 million. Approximately 700 thousand of
those are discouraged workers, i.e. workers who gave up hope of finding work.
It is perfectly plausible to assume that the subsistence of these people
depends on social welfare benefits and other resources such as rural ties and
solidarity funds etc.
Table 1 below
summarizes the unemployment statistics we have noted so far.
Table 1. Unemployment and labor force statistics
(thousand persons)
|
November 2010
|
November 2011
|
Labor force
|
25,665
|
26,696
|
Employed
|
22,854
|
24,267
|
Unemployed
|
2,811
|
2,429
|
Labor force participation rate (%)
|
48.6
|
49.4
|
Employment rate (%)
|
43.2
|
44.9
|
Unemployment rate (%)
|
11.0
|
9.1
|
Non-agricultural unemployment rate (%)
|
13.7
|
11.4
|
Unemployment rate among the youth (%)
|
20.8
|
17.0
|
Persons not in labor force
|
27,195
|
27,331
|
Unemployed according to broad definition
|
5,126
|
4,508
|
Broader (real) unemployment rate (%)
|
19,0
|
16.2
|
Source: TSI labor statistics
Another important
matter that we shall underline is the large magnitude of persons not classified
in the labor force4 in Turkey. The persons who are not seeking a job but
available to start a job are also a part of this category. 12.2 million of this
population, which exceeds 27 million persons in total, are housewives, 4.4
million are persons in education or training, and the rest are the retired,
disabled, ill or the elderly. These sections of the working class, which may be
considered as inactive population, provide yet another potential labor force
reserve to the capitalists apart from the unemployed. The ambition of the
latest steps to be taken in the direction of imposing greater flexibility in
the work regime in Turkey is to create a large labor force pool in which these
sections of the working class could be mobilized when required. Of course, with
the policies aiming to affiliate this population to the labor markets through
atypical work, the government seeks both to increase labor force circulation and
to exert downward pressure on the average wage, rights and working conditions
of the laborers.
The so-called
inactive population, which includes the underemployed5, seasonal workers and
persons not seeking a job but available to start a job as well, is an important
leverage for the capitalist class. Similarly, those who participate in the work
life after being a part of the large pool of inactive population will be
proletarianized under the ideological influence of the same section of the
population. Therefore, we may say that after the assault of imposing
flexibility is completed, the new working class will be even more alien to
ideas of organization and struggle due to both objective and subjective
factors.
A crucial issue worth
to mention is that the inactive population waiting to be included in the labor
force, the unemployed and the workers with below-subsistence wage levels have
gradually become more dependent on social welfare benefits and informal
solidarity networks such as religious communities and sects during the terms of
Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments. In this respect, we may claim
that the ideological deformation caused by lasting ties of the urbanizing
working class in Turkey with the countryside has eventually been replaced by
the deformation caused by social welfare benefits and communal solidarity and
charity networks as the former had been eliminated with the so-called “reforms”
made after 2001 crisis in Turkey.
The most up-to-date
data on the social welfare benefits provided by the government belong to late
2009. Yet, the time trend of the data provides sufficient information to
summarize the situation. According to official statistics, the amount of food
aids granted by the government to local administrations in order to be
distributed through Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations was 35 million
TL (approximately 23 million USD) in 2003, 55 million TL (approximately 34
million USD) in 2004, 90 million TL (approximately in 60 million USD) in 2005,
150 million (approximately 100 million USD) in 2006, 140 million TL
(approximately 93 million USD) in 2007, 213.7 million TL (approximately 142
million USD) in 2008 and 382.4 million TL (approximately 255 million USD) in
2009. We observe a similar, rapidly increasing trend in the provision of coal
aid as in the provision of food aid during the terms of the AKP government. The
number of households benefiting from the coal aid exceeded 2.2 million in 2009.
Since this figure has increased even more in 2010, we can say that we are
talking about a welfare item regarding approximately 12 million persons or
around 7 million electors. Table 2 shows the trend of coal aid provision from
2003 to 2009.
Table 2. Number of families benefitting from coal aid, 2003-2009
Year
|
Amount of coal distributed (in
tons)
|
Number of beneficiaries
(household)
|
2003
|
649,82
|
1,096,488
|
2004
|
1,052,379
|
1,610,170
|
2005
|
1,329,676
|
1,831,234
|
2006
|
1,363,288
|
1,797,083
|
2007
|
1,494,163
|
1,894,555
|
2008
|
1,827,131
|
2,246,280
|
In terms of housing
benefits, the government provided 919,900 TL (approximately 612,000 USD) to 415
persons in 2006, 2,503,950 TL (approximately 1,669,300 USD) to 642 persons in
2007, 40,461,955 TL (approximately 26,974,637 USD) to 27,906 persons in 2008
and 74,430,494 TL (approximately 49,620,329 USD) to 72,304 persons as of
December 2009.
As these data
suggest, the AKP government organized a broad social welfare network in which a
large section of the population is included. Apparently, in the perception of
these broad sections of the population, which as well include the working poor,
the unemployed and the inactive population, the character of the government as
a “service provider” has been replaced with the government as an “aid
provider”. This is an important factor as it fits into the larger picture of
changing perceptions on exploitation and inequalities. In this framework, the
rights of the working class is not perceived as something achieved through
struggle, but as something granted by the powerful. Hence, the public sphere
gets wide-open for religious and reactionary organizations as the culture of
“charity” is closely linked with religious ideology.
Besides social
welfare benefits and charity networks, borrowing has become an important mean
of subsistence for a large part of the working class and the mentioned
population surrounding it. The banking reforms and economic conjuncture after
2001 crisis facilitated the access to personal consumer credits and credit
cards have become one of the leading means of payment. Especially for the
workers who do not receive their wages and salaries regularly, credit cards are
essential. The highly indebted working class can be subjugated to the bourgeois
ideology way more easily and strongly, and its interest shifts to sustaining
the “economic stability” and the demands of the capitalist class so as to be
able to roll-over its debts. In other words, to the highly indebted workers,
the demands of their class enemies rather than their own seem much more relevant.
In order to give a
rough idea about the level of indebtedness, allow me to refer to several
statistics. In 2002, total amount of consumer credits were about 2 billion
dollars, whereas it was over 80 billion dollars in 2010, and more than 90 billion
dollars as of June 2011. The total liabilities of households were 129 billion
TL in 2008, 147 billion TL in 2009 and 191 billion TL in 2010. During the same
period, the ratio of households' total liabilities to their disposable income
has increased from 36 to 41 per cent. However, the ratio of interest payments
to the disposable income declined from 5.2 per cent to 4.4 per cent due to
falling interest rates. In other words, consumers are way more indebted, but
they allocate a lesser part of their income to interest payments. Thus, it is
plausible to claim that their sensitivity to the changes in interest rates has
increased. Almost half of the consumer credits are housing loans, whereas 45
per cent consists of personal finance credits and 5 per cent consists of
vehicle credits. The number of persons with non-performing credit card loans
has increased from around 1.1 million in 2008 to 1.6 million in March 2011.
Any development that
would disrupt the flow of social welfare benefits, charity and loans would mean
a disaster for the workers who gradually become more and more dependent on
these factors. Therefore, the stability of the bourgeois politics and abstinent
life has become their sole expectation for future. These circumstances are
further entrenched by the relative distance of young generations of workers to
the idea of organization and struggle.
The despair of
unemployed masses and the quest for a safe haven led by it have played a
significant role for the prevailing system to build the mass bases of
reactionism.
A third factor which
plays an important part in the fragmentation, disorganization, assimilation and
subjugation of the working class in Turkey is the expansion of informal work in
all sectors. It is impossible to talk about any kind of freedom for informal
workers, let alone the freedom to organize. Apart from unemployment, an
important reason for the toiling masses in Turkey to be engaged in informal
work is the high level of indebtedness. In Turkey, the government plays a
decisive role in collecting the loans, as non-performing loans are cashed out
through confiscation. The government regulates the regime of loan payments;
hence workers who either try to escape from the probability that their wages
are seized or make ends meet give consent to informal work with no rights at
all.
Origins of the
fragmentation of the working class in recent history
The fascist regime
established after the coup d'état on 12 September 1980 paved the way for the
Turkish bourgeoisie to raise its systematic attacks on the working class at a
massive scale, and the advantage achieved by the capitalist class has been
strongly reproduced in every sphere of life against the working class. The
fascist regime did not only consist of legal arrangements or the fascistic
practices carried out against working class organizations. More than that, it
was an all-out ideological assault on the working class
If one of the
fundamental pillars empowering bourgeoisie's ideological assault was the
policies that strengthen imperialism at large in our country and the region,
the other was the increasing distance between the communist movement and the
working class. This distance eventually resulted in the isolation of the
working class.
After 12 September
coup, the political parties, which should represent the working class and the
economic organizations of the working class, trade unions, have been weakened.
While the number of workers organized in trade unions was diminishing rapidly,
the trade unions assisted the endeavors to isolate the working class from
socialist politics. One shall remember that within the Turkish trade union
movement today, there are only a few class-oriented cadres, who mostly became
affiliated with the movement before 1980 when trade unions were not described
as “supra-political” organizations. Furthermore, even those cadres are forced
to a position at which they cannot take any initiative in order to protect
themselves in the trade unions, which are pushed to a compromising line after
the coup d'état.
It is worth to note
that the workers' resistances and actions, which occasionally set the agenda of
the country after 1980, were carried through by the unions. The
proletarianization of the country's agenda by these actions had lasted for
limited days. Although the achievements of the working class after these
rallies had been limited, they should be deemed as important experiences.
However, all of these experiences were doomed to the lack of persistence;
neither Turkish left nor trade unions could manage to raise this siege. Furthermore,
struggling workers could not prevent submissive trade unions to leave them in
the lurch. In the final analysis, as the trade unions did not allow the
workers' uprisings to be politicized, hence could not carry them through, these
actions did not leave deep marks in the collective memory of the proletariat as
moments of transcending fragmentation and solidarity.
For instance, the
recent uprising of tobacco workers at TEKEL started with the trade union's (Tek
Gıda-İş) decision to take action. As the workers pursued the decision even
beyond the trade union itself and as their rally got affiliated with the
communist movement, it was politicized, gained approval of the broader public
and achieved the ability to organize the society. However, we should mention
that, when considered in all respects, the intervention of the Communist Party
of Turkey to establish the ties between the communist movement and TEKEL
workers' resistance had been insufficient, and the representation of the
resistance did not materialize in the person of the TKP despite the strong
intervention.
The disconnectedness
between the working class and the communist movement is the main hindrance
before the act of leaving deep marks in the collective memory of the working
class. There is a clear connection between the trade union's ambition to
isolate the workers from communist politics and the fact that all significant
workers' resistances and actions carried out spontaneously and with the effort
of trade unions were not conducted to win new fronts in the class struggle, but
to maintain existing achievements. Such actions could not organize the society
at large. A class-oriented line of struggle with broader claims, which will
serve the working class to achieve new rights, could only be organized by the
communist movement that represent political assertions on the future of the
country.
Before going on with
other aspects of the condition of the working class in Turkey, let me say a few
more words on the situation of the so-called “progressive” trade union movement
and the gradual liquidation of the class-oriented line in this section.
When the
Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions6 (DİSK) was acquitted from all
charges pressed on it in 1991, the new leadership of DİSK adopted the dominant
political line of legitimizing the defeat of socialism prevailing in trade
unions. This attitude has certainly played an important role in alienating the
working class to economic and political struggle. As soon as the confederation
was re-established, the new, social democratic leadership of DİSK condemned
class-oriented trade unionism and adopted the ideology of so-called
“contemporary” trade unionism. As they interpreted the demise of socialism in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as the end of class struggle, they
expressed their willingness to come to terms with the capitalist class on every
platform; hence lost a great deal of its members. As DİSK denied the fact that
it is an organization of class struggle, it started to identify itself as a non-governmental
organization necessary for establishing compromise and social dialogue. On this
premise, the new DİSK could sidle with the organizations of the capitalist
class more easily.
After 1980, the
distance between the socialist left and the working class has increased even
more when a large part of the left got liberalized and gave up pursuing
revolutionary objectives. The liberalization of the Turkish left and the
transformation of DİSK into a “non-governmental organization” had gone
hand-in-hand.
In line with the
so-called conception of contemporary trade unionism, which denies the fact that
unions are class organizations, DİSK preferred “identity politics” instead of
class politics. Thus, it did not steadfastly challenged privatization policies,
and attributed positive characteristics to the so-called “new world order”. As
it became more and more alienated from the class struggle, it started to appeal
more and more to imperialist organizations such as the European Union and its
branches in the trade union movement.
Alienation from
revolutionary objectives and liberalization caused DİSK to lose a great deal of
its members. DİSK is losing members even today, and the number of trade unions
affiliated with DİSK, which organize genuine struggles is unfortunately very
low. Today, DİSK and the left-wing trade union confederation among the public
employees, KESK, do not fill a left-wing space in the trade union movement. The
libertarian voices of the liberal-reactionary coalition in our country are
quite far away from giving hope to the working class. These confederations are
forced to retreat at a level such that they promise not to do anything other
than demanding a new, democratic constitution despite grandiose attacks on the
working class.
The sectoral segregation
of the working class
Now, we may continue
with the changes in the composition of the working class in Turkey in terms of
economic sectors. This is not only important as regards the sectoral shifts in
workers' employment, but also in terms of the changes in the forms of
employment.
According to the TSI
data, in 2010, 25 per cent of the employment was in agriculture, 20 per cent in
industry, 6 per cent in construction and 49 per cent in services. Most of the
workers employed in industry work in the manufacturing industries, while 15 per
cent are employed in the trade sector and 5 per cent in restaurants and
entertainment.
The trends of the
sectoral change in employment in our country point to the dramatic change in
the Turkish economy and society. Two decades ago, i.e. in 1990, 46.5 per cent
of workers were employed in agriculture, 15.8 per cent in industry, 5.7 per
cent in construction and 32 per cent in services. In other words, in a
relatively short period of time, the percentage of those employed in
agriculture diminished about a half, while the number of those who are working
in services increased drastically. Although the construction sector grew a
great deal in years, its share in employment almost has not changed in the last
twenty years.
Informal work has
become a cost-reduction strategy for the Turkish capitalists. According to
official data, there are 3 million 535 thousand wage earners under informal
employment as of 2010, whereas the total amount of wage earners is 13 million
762. In other words, one out of four wage earners works under informal
contracts, with no job security at all.
Once again, according
to the official statistics, there are 3 million 37 thousand 447 workers
employed in the public sector as of March 2011. This figure amounts to 13.31
per cent of total employment and 4.1 per cent of the total population. In
historical terms, during the AKP's terms of government, the share of the public
sector in employment has declined from 15.2 per cent in 2002 to 13.31 per cent
in 2011.
Figure 1: The Share
of Workers Employed in the Public Sector in Total Employment (%)
Source: Turkish
Statistical Institute
In general, public
sector employees are employed under five different statuses: tenured personnel,
personnel on contract, temporary personnel, permanent worker and temporary
worker. About 70 per cent of the public employees (approximately 2 million) are
employed under tenured status. However, with the so-called “Public Employees
Reform” that has been on the agenda for quite a long time now, the government
aims to shift most of these tenured personnel to the personnel on contract
status. As a matter of fact, the number of employees working on contract has
increased almost 100 per cent since March 2007, despite the fact that its share
in total public sector employment is still low (10.93 per cent).
The condition of the
Kurdish workers
Since 1960s,
migration from Kurdish towns to especially large cities in the Aegean, Marmara
and Mediterranean regions has been continuing. Before 1985 the major reason of
migration was economic, but since then political reasons such as “forced
migration” due to war have been added on this. Therefore, although migration
from the Kurdish towns to the west is a phenomenon that has been going on for
the last five decades, it has accelerated considerably since early 1990s. The
change in the factors causing migration has not affected the outcomes
significantly. The main difference for the Kurdish population is much more
related with the rapid changes in the conditions of life and work in the towns
where they migrate.
One shall underline
that the character of the jobs the emigrant Kurdish people can find as well as
the working conditions in the western towns has been changing in years. During
the previous years of the migration movement, when the results of neoliberal
policies and practices had not emerge in full scope yet, the emigrant Kurdish
worker could usually find the opportunity to start a self-employed, though
informal, job such as peddling or petite commodity production. This opportunity
has either been eliminated almost totally or has become quite marginal starting
from late 1980s to the period of the AKP. As informal, insecure, subcontracting
and temporary, in other words atypical, work has become the rule of the day,
and as such forms of employment has become the dominant type since early 1990s,
the types of work Kurdish emigrants could find in the west have also changed.
In other words, instead of being located in marginal urban employments, the
Kurdish workers have become an inseparable part of the working class in Turkey.
For the same reason, emigrant Kurds are getting proletarianized much more
rapidly compared to the pace of proletarianization in the former years of
migration. However, this is not an entirely new and peculiar phenomenon, but it
is a part of the overall change of the working class in Turkey. However, the
qualitative difference of the new forms of proletarianization from the classic
processes is another topic of discussion.
The expansion of
atypical forms of employment, the gradual increase in the quantity of workers
in informal, insecure, subcontracting and temporary employment, is a general
phenomenon. As the more dynamic sections of the working class, which try
different ways of struggle, are those who work under such employment conditions
as well as those who are under the threat of insecurity, the Kurdish workers
have also become more visible in various experiences of organization and
struggle.
The increasing number
of Kurdish workers through migration to the metropolitan cities in the west or
in large Kurdish towns such as Diyarbakır does not weaken, but quite the
contrary; strengthen the class roots of the Kurdish problem. Compared to the
previous period, proletarianized Kurds have become more open to class politics
apart from identity politics.
An important
specification that should be noted in relation to Kurdish workers is that, the
processes of proletarianization among the Kurdish poor has been accelerating
–this is in contradistinction with the thesis that claims the working class in
Turkey has become “Kurdified”. Likewise, a new and common ground of struggle of
Turkish and Kurdish workers, who are increasingly being subject to informal,
insecure, subcontracting and temporary forms of employment, has been maturing
despite the relative weakness of the opportunities of organization.
1.
Member
of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Turkey
2.
Engels,
F., “The Condition of the Working Class in England”, in Collected Works, vol.4,
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p.297.
3.
The
broad definition of unemployment takes the following into account as well: the
underemployed, those who are not actively seeking a job but available to start
a job and seasonal workers. The real rate of unemployment is calculated
according to the following formula: (the unemployed + the underemployed + those
who are not actively seeking a job but available to start a job + seasonal
workers) / (the labor force + those who are not actively seeking a job but
available to start a job+ seasonal workers).
4.
This
category includes people at working age, i.e. 15 years of age or over.
5.
The
category of underemployment includes “time-related underemployment” and
“inadequate employment”. The former is described as persons employed in the
reference week who worked less than 40 hours as total, despite their
willingness to work additional hours. The latter is described as persons employed
in the reference week but were also looking for a job to replace present job or
as an additional job within last 4 weeks and were available to start if could
find.
6.
Interestingly
enough, the official documents of DİSK in English refers to the organization as
the Confederation of “Progressive” Trade Unions, despite the fact that its name
is “Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfedarasyonu” in Turkish, which can literally
be translated into English as the Confederation of “Revolutionary” Trade
Unions.
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